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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARDEN R. KOHLER and JOY J.
KOHLER,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,

vs.
STEPHEN C. MARTIN,
Defendant.

Civil No: 7122
Judge: Guy R. Burningkam

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Judge
in the above entitled court sitting without a jury on the 12th, 13th and 14th of October, 1994.
The Court, having heard all the evidence and arguments of counsel and being fully advised in
the premises, now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs are the owners of a residence and real property in Midway City,

Wasatch County, State of Utah, more particularly described as follows:
Beginning 660 feet North and 15.25 chains West of the Southeast corner of the
Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian; and running thence West 132 feet; thence South 137 feet; thence East
132 feet; thence North 137 feet to the point of beginning.
2.

The Defendant is a resident of Midway City, Wasatch County, State of Utah, and

the owner of a residence and real property therein, more particularly described as follows:
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Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.25 chains from the Southeast
corner of the Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 89 degrees 12 minutes West 56.1
feet; thence North 648.6 feet to the South line of the Eugene Probst property;
thence Easterly 319.44 feet to a point 362.34 feet North of the Northeast corner
of Harold Fabian's property; thence South 362.34 feet; thence North 89 degrees
12 minutes West 132.1 feet, thence South 11.5 feet; thence West 132 feet; thence
South to the point of beginning.
3.

The real property of the Plaintiffs and that of the Defendant are adjacent to each

other and abut along the West and North boundaries of the Plaintiffs' land. Defendant's deed
includes title to a substantial portion of a roadway lying to the West and extending Southward
from the Plaintiffs' land which connects with Second North Street.

The relationship of

Plaintiffs' and Defendant's properties and the roadway are illustrated by Plaintiffs' Exhibit
15(A), a copy of which is attached hereto marked "Exhibit A" and made a part hereof by
reference.
4.

The Court finds from clear and convincing evidence that the roadway adjacent to

Plaintiffs' real property and extending northward from the intersection of Second North Street
and Second West Street of Midway City to a line extended westerly from the north side of
Plaintiffs' asphalt driveway where it enters the Plaintiffs' property was historically and
continuously used by the general public as a public thoroughfare for far in excess of a 10 year
period of time. The width of the thoroughfare area extended from fences along its west side and
east side which are still in their historic locations. The entire thoroughfare area was used by the
general public both for passage of people and animals and for the travel and parking of vehicles.
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The use of the thoroughfare by the public was not only in connection with the use of the land
now owned by the Plaintiffs, but also for access by the public to the lands north of the properties
of these parties. The thoroughfare area was always open for the free and unobstructed passage
of people and vehicles from its south end northward past the Plaintiffs' land from before 1922
to at least 1948. The said thoroughfare area is now used and claimed by Plaintiffs for access
to and the use of their property.
5.

The public thoroughfare which lies upon the land of Defendant is described as

follows:
Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.23 chains from the Southeast
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian (recorded as the point of beginning for property
owned by Stephen C. Martin as recorded in Entry #144387, Book 196, Page 324
of Wasatch County Records);
Thence N 89°12'00" W a distance of 56.10 feet to Paul Wilson
property line; thence North along said property line a distance of
277 feet more or less to a point at the intersection of a line
extended westerly along the North side of an Asphalt driveway
entering the Marden Kohler property; thence West along said
extended line a distance of 56.09 feet to the West property line of
Marden Kohler; thence South partially along Kohler property
boundary a distance of 277 feet more or less to the point of
beginning.
6.

The roadway thoroughfare established by public usage has never been abandoned

or vacated by order of any highway authorities having jurisdiction over the roadway, or by other
competent authority.
7.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Plaintiffs predecessors

in title, the Buhler family, operated a commercial swimming facility with two pools and a store
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upon the land now owned and occupied by the Plaintiffs' residence. The Buhler's facilities were
known as the Buhler's Hot Pots, and although they never owned the land upon which the
roadway is located, the roadway was used for many years, far in excess of 10 years, by the
general public as a thoroughfare for access and egress and parking of vehicles going to the
Buhler facilities and also for access to the land north of those facilities which was a popular
geologic and thermal spring area known as the "Mound". The entire roadway was used for such
purposes and is the same roadway as is now used by the Plaintiffs for access to their property.
The roadway has been regularly used by Plaintiffs' and their parents, Reed and Elda Kohler for
access to their property since the summer of 1966. The roadway was always open without
obstruction to the free passage of the public and vehicles.
8,

The Court finds by a preponderance of evidence that in the summer of 1966, prior

to purchasing the land where they built their home, Plaintiffs' parents, Reed and Elda Kohler
approached William Ferrin Whitaker and Martha B. Whitaker (who were then the owners of the
land now owned by Defendant) and sought their permission to use the roadway for access to
what is now Plaintiffs land if they were to buy it and build their home there. That land
formerly occupied by Buhler's Hot Pots, would otherwise have been landlocked. The Whitakers
were aware of all the material facts and agreed and gave their permission intending it to be
permanent and without restriction or limitation. Reed and Elda Kohler then bought the land in
August 1966 and immediately thereafter built their home on it in reasonable reliance upon the
permission and easement that had been granted by the Whitakers.

The Kohlers had the

continuous, regular and uninterrupted use of the roadway from the summer of 1966 until July
29, 1992, when Defendant put a padlock on a gate he had recently installed near the South end
of the roadway. Until Defendant locked the gate there had been no effort by Defendant or any
of his predecessors in title to withdraw permission for use of the roadway. Defendant's action
in installing and locking the gate, caused significant detriment to Plaintiffs and if allowed to
resume or continue, would cause Plaintiffs and their tenants irreparable harm, including harm
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to health and safety and this court entered a preliminary injunction in this action on September
21, 1992 requiring Defendant to unlock the gate and cease interfering with Plaintiffs' and their
tenants use of the roadway.
9.

The Whitakers had asphalted and improved the road before granting Kohlers

permission to use it. After the Kohlers had built and were occupying their home, the Whitakers
first communicated to Reed Kohler a demand that he pay the Whitakers for a percentage of the
value of the land in the roadway, a percentage of the cost of the improvements the Whitakers
had installed, and to share in the future maintenance. Hda Kohler was not a party to that
conversation and never agreed to make the payment demanded.

Reed Kohler never made

payment and died on June 9, 1969. The Whitakers thereafter continued to repeatedly make
demands upon Hda Kohler for payment for the land and improvements, thereby manifesting that
her continued use of the roadway was adverse to their interests.
10.

In April of 1972 the Whitakers presented to Elda Kohler a formal written proposal

for an agreement for payment for and use of the roadway. Elda Kohler never agreed to the
proposal but continued the regular use of the roadway. The Whitakers never interrupted or
objected to her use of the roadway although they continued to demand payment during the entire
time they owned the land now owned by Defendant. Elda Kohler's use of the roadway was
open, notorious, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted from April of 1972. The Whitakers
failure to pursue their claim for payment effectively waived any rights they may have had to
collect payment for the land and improvements.
11.

On December 9, 1980, the Whitakers deeded their land to their brother and sister-

in-law Richard Fred Bassett and Karen E. Bassett, who had knowledge of the use of the roadway
and easement by the Kohlers. The lay of the land, the asphalt surfacing and improvements made
it apparent that the roadway was the means of access to the Kohler residence and had been used
over a long number of years. The location of the Kohlers attached garage facing onto the
roadway and the asphalt driveways extending from the asphalt of the roadway to the Kohler
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garage contributed to make the Kohler use open, visible, notorious and adverse. Their use was
regular, continuous, unobstructed and uninterrupted during the ownership of the land by
Bassetts. The Bassetts never gave permission for the use of the roadway by Elda Kohler or the
Plaintiffs which use was clearly adverse as to the Bassetts.
12.

On April 10, 1980, Elda Kohler deeded her land and residence to the Plaintiffs

although she continued to live in the home and use the roadway until 1992. Elda Kohler and
Plaintiffs continued to have the uninterrupted and unobstructed regular and continuous use of the
roadway thereafter.
13.

At the end of 1987, the Bassetts deeded the land and roadway to the Defendant,

Stephen C. Martin, who likewise had knowledge of the use of the roadway and easement by the
Kohlers. The circumstances were unchanged from what they were during the ownership by the
Bassetts. Defendant never gave permission for use by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs use of the
roadway continued regularly, continuously and uninterrupted and unobstructed and was also
open, visible, notorious and adverse to the Defendant until he locked the gate on July 29, 1992.
14.

Plaintiffs and their parents had the open and unrestricted use of the roadway

adversely to Defendant and his predecessors in title for over 20 years (from April 1972 when
Whitakers first demanded payment for the land and improvements until July 29, 1992 when
Defendant locked the metal gate he installed near the south end of the roadway). Defendant
installed the gate in April 1992, but the Kohlers and their tenants continued unrestricted use of
the roadway until Defendant locked it with a padlock on July 29, 1992.
15.

The Court finds that Defendant has harassed the Plaintiffs and their tenants and

invitees in the use of the roadway and thoroughfare, that his actions in installing and locking the
metal gate causing the necessity for the Preliminary Injunction to be entered in this action was
in violation of Plaintiffs rights and give rise to the necessity that this Court enter its order and
a permanent injunction requiring that Defendant forthwith remove the gate and its metal posts,
from in any way obstructing the free and open usage by persons and vehicles of the roadway as
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described herein and from interfering in any way with the use by Plaintiffs, their successors and
assigns and their tenants, guests, friends, relatives, visitors, invitees and others from the free
and open use of the roadway for access, egress and parking in connection with the use of
Plaintiffs' property and this Court should enter its order to restore them to their free and open
usage of the roadway and thoroughfare. Defendant should likewise be restrained from harassing
in any way or causing problems for Plaintiffs and such other persons in the use of the roadway
and thoroughfare.
16.

There have been feelings generated between the parties such that the Plaintiffs

should also be restrained from harassing, belittling or causing problems with the Defendants' use
of his land so long as his use does not interfere with their rights and Plaintiffs should exercise
their influence to prevent any such actions by their tenants and family members.
17.

The parties have in the past shared in the care and maintenance of the portion of

the roadway from its north boundary described in paragraph 5 of these findings down to the
north boundary of Second North Street of Midway City. The Plaintiffs and their predecessors
have in the past done the care by way of mowing and watering on the east side of the asphalt
surfacing and the Defendant has done it on the West side. There is a need that the parties

should continue to share in the care and maintenance in that way.

As to any need for

maintenance or repair of the asphalt surfacing, when Defendant determines there is such a need,
he should be ordered to determine a time frame for the work and obtain a bid and submit it to
Plaintiffs for approval a reasonable time before the proposed work is to begin. If Plaintiffs do
not approve of the bid or if Defendant fails to obtain a bid for work Plaintiffs deem necessary,
Plaintiffs shall obtain a bid and submit it to Defendant. The work shall be let to the lowest
responsible bidder and the parties shall share equally in the cost.
18.

The Court does not find that Defendant's defense of this action was without merit

and entered in bad faith as to the substance of the case, however, the Court should reserve for
later determination the issues raised in the Order to Show Cause for Contempt of Court
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heretofore entered in this action as well as the question of the award of attorney fees in
connection therewith.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The roadway which is the subject of this action and that portion of Defendant's

land as described in paragraph 5 of the Court's Findings of Fact in this action became and still
is a public thoroughfare under the provisions of Section 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended; and as such the Plaintiffs, and their successors in interest in their land are entitled
to the free and unobstructed permanent use of the roadway for access and egress and vehicular
travel and parking in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' residence and real property which
land is more particularly described in Paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact.
2.

Plaintiffs are the owners of an easement and right of way over and upon the

roadway described in paragraph 5 of the Court's Findings of Fact, William Ferrin Whitaker and
Martha B. Whitaker, the then owners of the fee title to the roadway granted the easement, by
oral agreement which was acted and relied upon by Reed and Elda Kohler and established a
permanent and unrestricted easement for use of the roadway. The Kohlers reliance upon that
grant of easement by their use of the roadway and constructing their substantial home made that
grant of easement irrevocable. They and the Plaintiffs have continued to use the roadway for
over 27 years in reliance upon that grant of easement. The Kohler land is the dominant estate
and the Defendant's land the servient estate in relation to that easement. Plaintiffs and their
successors have the right to that permanent easement which is a right which runs with their land
for the continued permanent use of the easement and roadway.
3.

The Court also concludes as a matter of law that the doctrines of promissory

estoppel and equity apply to the facts of this case to prevent Defendant from withdrawal of the
promise and agreement of his predecessors, the Whitakers, granting the Kohlers the permanent
use of the roadway by reason of the following elements:
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a.

The promise and agreement was reasonable expected to induce reliance by

the Kohlers.
b.

The Kohlers reasonably relied upon and took action in reliance upon the

promise and agreement by buying their land, building their home and using the roadway.
c.

There would be significant and substantial detriment to the Plaintiffs for

the Defendant to be allowed to withdraw the permission and agreement.
d.
4.

The promissors, the Whitakers, were aware of all material facts.

The Court further finds as a matter of law that Plaintiffs have established that they

also own a prescriptive easement for the permanent and unrestricted use of that portion of the
roadway upon Defendant's land as described in Paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact for the
continued use for access and egress and vehicular travel and parking in connection with the use
of their residence and real property which perscriptive easement is a right which runs with the
land.
5.

The Court should enter its permanent restraining order and order for the care and

maintenance for the roadway and thoroughfare as set forth in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of the
Findings of Fact.
DATED and signed this _ / 2 - d a y of April, 1995.

Approved as to form:

Robert Felton
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PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASATCH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MARDEN R. KOHLER and JOY J.
KOHLER,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
STEPHEN C. MARTIN,

:

Civil No: 7122

Defendant.

:

Judge: Guy R. Burningham

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, Judge
of the above entitled court sitting without a jury on the 12th, 13th and 14th of October, 1994.
The Court, having heard all the evidence and arguments of counsel and being fully advised in
the premises, and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS NOW THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.

Plaintiffs are granted judgment that the roadway on the west and adjacent to

Plaintiffs' real property is a public thoroughfare extending northward from the intersection of
Second North Street and Second West Street of Midway City, Utah to a line extended westerly
along the north side of the asphalt driveway where it enters Plaintiffs' real property. That
portion of the public thoroughfare which lies upon the land of the Defendant and to which
Defendants' land is subject is described as follows:

on

Beginning at a point North 5.68 chains and West 17.23 chains from the Southeast
corner of the Northeast Quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian (recorded as the point of beginning for property
owned by Stephen C. Martin as recorded in Entry #144387, Book 196, Page 324
of Wasatch County Records);
Thence N 89°12'00H W a distance of 56.10 feet to
Paul Wilson property line; thence North along said
property line a distance of 277 feet more or less to
a point at the intersection of a line extended
westerly along the North side of an Asphalt
driveway entering the Marden Kohler property;
thence West along said extended line a distance of
56.09 feet to the West property line of Marden
Kohler; thence South partially along Kohler
property boundary a distance of 277 feet more or
less to the point of beginning;
2.

Plaintiffs are granted judgment that they are the owners of the right to the free

and unobstructed permanent use of the said public thoroughfare for access and egress and
vehicular travel and parking in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' residence and real property
which is more particularly described as follows:
Beginning 660 feet North and 15.25 chains West of the Southeast corner of the
Northeast quarter of Section 34, Township 3 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake
Meridian; and running thence West 132 feet; thence South 137 feet; thence East
132 feet; thence North 137 feet to the point of beginning.
3.

Plaintiffs rights to the use of said public thoroughfare are rights that are

appurtenant to and run with their land and may be conveyed to their successors in interest.
4.

Plaintiffs are granted judgment that they are the owners of a private easement and

right of way acquired both by a grant of easement and by prescriptive easement over and upon
the said roadway and thoroughfare and specifically that portion of Defendant's land described
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in Paragraph 1 above. Said easement and right of way is for the unobstructed and permanent
use for access and egress and vehicular travel and parking in connection with Plaintiffs' real
property described in Paragraph 2 above. Plaintiffs' right to said easement is hereby quieted in
them and is a permanent right that is appurtenant to and runs with their land and can be
conveyed to their successors in interest.
5.

The Defendant is hereby ordered to forthwith remove the metal gate and gateposts

he caused to be installed upon the roadway and thoroughfare that is the subject of this action and
is hereby permanently enjoined from in any way obstructing the free and open travel by persons
and vehicles upon any portions of the roadway from Second North Street northward to the north
line of the land described in Paragraph 1 above. Defendant is further permanently enjoined from
interfering with, harassing or otherwise causing problems in any with the use by Plaintiffs, their
successors and assigns and their tenants, guests, friends, relatives, visitors, invitees and others
from the free and open use of the roadway and thoroughfare for access, egress and parking of
vehicles in connection with the use of Plaintiffs' property.
6.

The Plaintiffs are hereby restrained from harassing, belittling or causing problems

with Defendant's use of the roadway and his land so long as that use does not interfere with
their rights. Plaintiffs are further ordered to strive to exercise what influence they can to
prevent any such actions by their tenants and family members.
7.

It is ordered in relation to the care, maintenance and repairs of the improvements

in the roadway and thoroughfare for the area described in Paragraph 1 above the parties shall
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continue the practice of sharing in such work, such that Plaintiff will do the care, mowing
watering and maintenance on the east side of the asphalt surfacing and Defendant shall do it on
the west side. As to repair or maintenance of the asphalt surfacing, when Defendant determines
there is such a need, he shall set a reasonable time frame and obtain a bid for the work and
submit it to Plaintiffs for their approval a reasonable time before the proposed work is to begin.
If Plaintiffs do not approve of the bid or timing for the work or if Defendant fails to obtain a
bid for work Plaintiffs deem is necessary, Plaintiffs shall obtain a bid and submit it to
Defendant. The work shall be let to the lowest responsible bidder and the parties shall share
equally in the cost.
8.

Plaintiffs are granted their costs in this action.

9,

The Court reserves for later determination in this action the issues raised by the

Order to Show Cause for Contempt of Court heretofore entered in this action as well as the
question of the award of attorney fees in connection therewith.
DATED and signed this ^f

day ofN^cmlcK

199^

^

Approved as to form:
Robert Felton

State of Utah
^
County of Wasatch )
I, the undersigned, clerk of the district court of Wasatch
County, Utah, do hereby certify that the annexed and foregoing
is a true and full copy of an original document on file in my*
office as such clerk.
<i
Witness my hand and seal of said court this 2 & J ^

By:

T^n^ 1
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ROBERT FELTON, #1056
Attorney for Defendant
39 Exchange Place, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5835
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARDEN R. KOHLER and
JOY J. KOHLER,

:

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
OR TO AMEND JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. 7122

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Judge GUY R. BURNINGHAM
STEPHEN C. MARTIN,

:

Defendant.
ROBERT FELTON, Attorney for the Defendant hereby moves this
Court to grant a new trial or to amend the judgment in the aboveentitled action.

This motion is submitted pursuant to Rule 59 of

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

There was significant irregularity in theses proceedings

in allowing the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint after the trial
was completed. Said action severely prejudiced the Defendant since
he had no knowledge concerning the claim of estoppel and was
prevented from eliciting testimony or calling witnesses to meet
this issue.
2.

This action also surprised the defense.

The Court's finding that a public thoroughfare existed

constitutes an error in law and was not supported by the evidence.
3.

The Court's finding of a prescriptive easement was not
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supported by the evidence and was an error in law.
4.

The Court7s findings that the prior owner had given

permission and that permission was binding on Stephen Martin was
not supported by the evidence and is error.
5.

This motion is based upon the memorandum of law submitted

herewith.
DATED this ) /

day of January, 1995.

ROBERT FELTON
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

JJ

day of January, 1995, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR TO AMEND JUDGMENT to A. DEAN JEFFS, Attorney at Law, P.O.
Box 888, Provo, Utah 84603.
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State of Utah
County rf '*'
- - • c r "t cf Wasatch
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County.L '
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2
3
4
5
6
7

8

COURT'S FINDINGS

MARDEN KOHLER,

TRIAL

Plaintiff,

CASE #7122

vs .

HON. GUY R. BURNINGHAM

STEPHEN C. MARTIN,
Defendant

9
10
11

BE IT REMEMBERED

that on the 12th and 14th

12

days of October, 1994 this matter came on for trial

13

before the HONORABLE GUY R. BURNINGHAM, Judge of

14

the above-named court.

15

A P P E A R A N C E S
16

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
17
18
19

A. DEAN JEFFS, ESQ.
M. DAYLE JEFFS, ESQ.
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.
90 NORTH 100 EAST
PROVO UT 846 01

20

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
21

(OL

22

ROBERT FELTON, ESQ.
39 EXCHANGE PLACE, STE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111

23

<y>

24
25

PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR
10445 SOUTH 600 EAST
SALEM, UT. 84653
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1

it clearly on both counts*

2

COURT'S

3

THE C O U R T :

And we'll submit i t .
FINDINGS

Thank y o u .

Let me ask a

4

couple of questions for you to think a b o u t , and

5

I've

6

b i t , as you prepare to further advise me on the

7

law, not just the e s t o p p e l .

8

going to make some f i n d i n g s .

thought about and are troubling me a little

9

In doing this

I do find by clear and convincing

I'm

evidence

10

that a public thoroughfare was created by the

11

general public use from, help me out on the

12

s t r e e t s , Second N o r t h .

13

Second--

14

MR. FELTON:

15

THE COURT:

Excuse m e , and is it

West, I believe.
West.

Up to approximately

16

area that the large tree is now.

17

almost parallel to where the pool w a s .

18

include the driveway, a portion of the

19

driveway presently being used by the K o h l e r s .

20

The question I h a v e , and I'm

the

That seems to be
It will
entire

going to make

21

a finding h e r e , that insofar as the public use is

22

concerned, the public abandoned their use of it

23

somewhere around, or shortly after, 1948.

24

find by clear and convincing

25

otherwise there's a public thoroughfare

evidence

I cannot

that
created.
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1

N o w , the statutes seem quite c l e a r , that

2

in order for the abandonment

3

the governmental entity to occur, that some

4

by competent authority would have to occur. And

5

that has not

6
7

There's a case footnoted

in 27-12-90

that

1 haven't read y e t , but it peaked my interest.
MR. FELTON:

9

THE COURT:
Says:

Is it

Osguthorpe?

It's Mallory v s . Taggert.

"Corporation was able to give

11

title to land platted

12

alleyways but never used as such

13

under proviso in former law, road

14

used or worked

15

to be a highway."

16

action

happened.

8

10

of that public use by

I'm

good

for streets

for five years

and
since
not

ceased

not sure what that m e a n s . I'm

sure

17

what the case says.

18

even know if it's still good law as far as

19

is concerned.

20

if there is case law that in some way does

21

the p u b l i c , who created the public way, can then

22

abandon that public way through their

23

their public u s e .

24

25

It's a 1970 case.

not

I don't
Shepards

B u t , it peaked my interest to wonder

discontinuing

So having made those two findings,

let you help me out on the law.

allow

I'll

If the only way
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1 II it can be abandoned

is through competent

authority,

2 || then it's a public way up to about the t r e e , but
3 II not
4

beyond.
I don't see that the uses that I heard

5

a b o u t , although they were over a long period

6

t i m e , they were somewhat

7

most p a r t , including the s l a u g h t e r h o u s e , were

8

the benefit of the owner of title of the

9

sporadic.

And for the

M r . Kohler who ran the processing p l a n t .

11

any use would have been really

12

the property

to
And

so

for the benefit

of

owner anyway, not a public u s e .

That falls within the cases t o o , that

14

invitees even o f , and business dealings with

15

owner of the property that crossed that

16

can't create that public u s e .

17

for

land.

The Abegglens leased the property

10

13

of

the

property

As to the Buehler property, they

never

18

owned this way.

And t h e r e , the general public

19

come and brought horses and b u g g i e s , there were

20

posts t h e r e .

21

popular I do find by clear and convincing

22

that they were parked up there right within

23

right-of-way

24

as the tree and the portion of the

25

presently being used by the K o h l e r s .

And when the automobiles became

did
tie

more

evidence
the

that we're talking about and as high
driveway
The

Buehlers
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1 || never owned that
2 ||

property.

These public ways have to have a terminus

3 II sometime.

And when we say it led nowhere, it led

4

to that p o i n t .

5

not only for swimming but also to go up for their

6

picnics and hiking.

7

that way to go to school.

8

it would have created more than a footpath at that.

9

And they arrived there and

parked,

And school children came
A g a i n , I'm

down

not sure that

And maybe it's my poor eyesight, but I

10

can't see from the aerial photographs the evidence,

11

and we didn't go up on the site and look at it.

12

Perhaps being t h e r e - - I had a similar case in this

13

county where we went up and the road was apparent.

14

There were still ruts and, although it hadn't

15

used for a long time.

16
17
18

But I do find it was used for

been

vehicular

traffic.
I guess I have another concern raised by

19

your rebuttal, M r . J e f f s , where you say these

are

20

not mutually exclusive.

21

not sure an individual can adverse the government.

22

And so the things that would apply, either by way

23

of promissory estoppel or by prescriptive

24

may not have the same application as against

25

city or town.

If it is a public way

I'm

easement
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1

II

So we're getting into the dilemma that I

2 || t h i n k , it's beyond the dilemma you were
3 II a b o u t , the one that I'm
4

talking

struggling with now.

Let

me go on.

5

I find by preponderance of the

evidence

6

that the K o h l e r s , this being Reed and Elda K o h l e r ,

7

approached

8

sought permission to use the right-of-way.

9

same portion that they ended up using for the

10

the W h i t a k e r s , Ferrin and M a r t h a , and

driveway to their home.

11

I find they relied upon t h a t , they

12

their home in reliance upon that and began

13

the right-of-way

I do find that sometime

15

Martha Whitaker did present an agreement.

16

I've

MR. A. DEAN JEFFS:
EXHIBIT

19

and

I think

not sure.

I believe

that's

13.
THE C O U R T :

W e l l , they presented

20

agreement to Elda Kohler.

21

was t h a t , a verbal agreement.

22

finding.

23

using

later Ferrin

got the wrong exhibit h e r e , I'm

17

built

upon that r e l i a n c e .

14

18

The

I think the

the

testimony

And let me make

I do find that a verbal agreement

24

presented to M r . Reed Kohler which

25

contribution

this

was

sought

from him for one half of the costs of
PENNY C. A B B O T T , CSR
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1 II the improvements that had already been made to the
2 II lane, and an agreement to share costs in
3
4

future

maintenance and improvements.
That was a verbal agreement f

and was a

5

contract only between Reed and Ferrin Whitaker.

6

They're the two that talked about it.

7

The contract has some of the same

legal

8

problems that the permissive easement h a s ,

i.e.,

9

it was not in writing at that time.

Statute

So the

10

of Frauds would have come into play.

11

that there would be a problem in that c o n t r a c t ,

12

perhaps failing for want of consideration.

13

reason being, the original permission was

given

14

without limitation.

once

15

permission is granted and reliance is made

16

improvements are m a d e , it becomes

17

I think

And as I understand,

too

The

and

irrevocable.

I find that the Kohlers did help

maintain

18

the lane in watering and mowing and just the

19

general maintenance of their portion, inside I

20

g u e s s , of the lane, during the very early t i m e s .

21

And that continued on until M r s . Kohler, I think,

22

probably became unable to do all of the work

23

she had d o n e , although she continued to do what

24

could in watering.

25

that

To the extent that the verbal contract

she

and
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1

later the written c o n t r a c t , which was presented

2

Elda Kohler by M r . and M r s . Whitaker which

3

have been sometime a f t e r , during or after April of

4

1 9 7 2 , I find that Elda Kohler never agreed to the

5

contract.

6

between her husband and the Whitakers and was not a

7

party to that c o n t r a c t .

And she never agreed

8

the terms and conditions

set forth in the

9

agreement.

would

She had knowledge of the verbal

contract

to

written

To that e x t e n t , since April of

10

u s e , and the use of the owners of the

11

property, has been adverse to the Whitakers

12

their

13

'72 her

Kohler
and

successors.
And so notwithstanding my very

early

14

comments about adversing the g o v e r n m e n t , the

15

Kohlers would be entitled to a prescriptive

16

easement over the same portion I've

17

indicated, the part that they've used up to and

18

around the t r e e .

19
20
21

to

(SKIP IN TAPE
THE C O U R T : —
that the right

already

@ #3321).

Barretts.

Excuse m e .

Is

name?

22

UNIDENTIFIED

23

THE COURT:

SPEAKERS:

Bassetts.

B a s s e t t s , excuse m e .

As to

24

the B a s s e t t s 1

25

not sure you can change the status by saying okay,

and the M a r t i n s ' permissive u s e ,

I'm
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1

we'll give you permission to use a right-of-way, or

2

give one permission to do what they are

3

doing.

4

character of the fact that the Whitakers

5

seeking compensation

6

compensation was never sought through

7

proceedings.

8

been enforced in a timely m a n n e r , might have

9

enforced, but I think the Statute of

I don't believe you can change

already
the
were

for the easement, which
legal

So even the verbal c o n t r a c t , had it
been

Limitations

10

have long run on that.

11

Whitakers waived any, any rights that they may

12

had to collect on that.

13

And I find that the
have

I find that all of the successors of the

14

Whitakers had knowledge of the lane and

easement

15

and use of the K o h l e r s .

16

land it's apparent that that was the access

that

17

had been used over a long number of y e a r s .

The

18

direction the garage faces, the practicality.

19

just very apparent that the knowledge of the use

20

was there.

21

their understanding

22

p e r m i s s i v e , they would not be able to change

23

character of the prescriptive rights by

24

giving permission to do what plaintiffs and

25

predecessors were already

Just by the lay of the

It's

And that even if they were mistaken

in

of whether or not that use was
the

later
their

doing.
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1

As to the terms of the proposed

contract,

2

it provided upon the demise of Elda K o h l e r , or the

3

sale of the h o m e , that the right-of-way was to be

4

purchased by its t e r m s .

5

was sold back in 1980 from Elda Kohler to Marden

6

Kohler and Joy K o h l e r .

7

assuming

8

that first term came into b e i n g , that no action was

9

taken to enforce it at that time either;

And I find that the

home

So if that c o n t r a c t ,

it had any a f f e c t , even at the date

that

one of

10

the conditions having then been m e t , the sale of

11

the home.

12

This is an unfortunate

situation

between

13

neighbors and a purchaser of a home in an a r e a ,

14

with an understanding

15

right-of-way

16

and tempers

17

feelings get in the way of calm and

18

understanding

19

that he has that

is limited.

And then when

flared, I think sometimes

and

this
feelings

these

collective

logic.

I don't find any bad faith on the part of

20

the defendant.

I think because of those

21

disagreements

22

neighbors that he's doing everything

23

ought to do legally to protect his r i g h t s .

24

defenses are not without m e r i t , without a sound,

25

reasonable b a s i s .

and misunderstandings

between

the

he feels

he

His

And so I find no bad faith

on

PENNY C. A B B O T T , CSR
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1 || his part.
2 ||
3
4

II

And I think we'll put to rest

attorney's

fees being a part of the d a m a g e s . They will

not be

insofar as the damages in the lawsuit.

5

Now, I will reserve attorney's

fees

6

regarding the contempt question that is still

7

pending before the Court.

8

not he violated an order of the C o u r t , thereby

9

necessitating the Order to Show Cause that

That being whether

10

before the Court.

11

that portion of the attorney's

12

found.

13

came

And so we may need to carve

out

fees if contempt

I find that because of these feelings

14

it would be appropriate to grant

15

o r d e r s , restraining both p a r t i e s .

16

p o s s i b l e , even members of families who are

17

nonparties to this action, from in anyway

18

harassing, belittling, causing problems with

19

of the families

20

or

is

that

restraining
And insofar as

each

respectively.

The gate should be removed

from its

21

present location.

If defendant desires to

22

construct it up above the easement that

23

granted, he's certainly

24

that. It would keep traffic that may come up that

I've

free and welcome to do

25 II roadway at least from continuing on up into his
PENNY C. A B B O T T , CSR
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1

r e s i d e n t i a l , immediate residential

2

The trash that I've

area.

heard a b o u t , I didn't

3

really hear evidence that it's obstructing

4

of the right-of-way.

5

the d e f e n d a n t .

6

unneighborly, I don't find that it violates

7

rights or l a w s , nor does it interfere with

8

easement.

9

It is on property owned by

And while it may be unsightly

(SKIP IN TAPE

10

any
the

THE C O U R T : -- Whitakers never revoked
permissive use that they gave initially.

12

that the use by the plaintiffs was open

13

visible.
I find that the Bassetts never

and

gave

permission

16

that supports that the use has been a d v e r s e .

18
19

for the u s e , which is a further

MR. FELTON:
y o u , Your Honor.

I'm

sorry.

I didn't

finding

hear

I--

THE COURT:

I said I find that M r . Bassett

20

never gave permission to use the

21

Which again supports the adverse use by the

22

plaintiffs.

23

any

I find

15

17

and

@ #4277)

11

14

the use

If I haven't already

right-of-way.

said i t , the

24

W h i t a k e r s ' permission originally

25

restrictions.

given was

without
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1
2

MR. M. DAYLE JEFFS:

You already

voiced

that one.

3

THE COURT:

Thank you.

4

I find there was no interruption in the

5

use from and after the time that the

6

became the owners of the property

7

plaintiffs

in 1980.

I find too that Elda Kohler was away

from

8

the property at least nine months prior to her

9

death and there was no interruption

in the use of

10

the right-of-way when she left.

11

restricted, the permission or t h e , I guess the use

12

was not simply restricted to Elda's u s e , but it was

13

the plaintiffs and their invitees and others

14

using it at that time.

15

It was not

were

And again, I may have said t h i s , but
say it again if I've

I've

16

noted it twice so I'll

17

said it.

18

change the terms of their grant as presented

19

in the verbal agreement and in the later

20

agreement, I'm not sure that the terms are any

21

different, but there were two different times

that

22

it was presented, once to M r . Reed Kohler and

later

23

to Elda Kohler in the written form.

24

that it attempted to change the t e r m s , the use

25

became

That the attempt of the Whitakers

already
to
both

written

To the

extent

adverse
PENNY C. A B B O T T , CSR
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1

II

From the testimony

of Martha W h i t a k e r ,

she

2

indicated because Elda couldn't handle it they

3

backed off.

4

the collection and demand and eviction, or whatever

5

else they might have d o n e .

6

forgot about i t " .

7

And I think by doing that they

Her words were

waived

"we

I find too that even the Whitakers

were

8

surprised when they purchased the property

9

learn, after they called

for a survey, that

the

10

road was on their land.

Up until then even

they

11

thought it was a public

12

to

way.

While I agree with the statement that a

13

payment of $933.44 would have been a much

14

economical way to handle this some years a g o , it's

15

not relevant to the respective rights of the

16

parties.

17

in the finding, but that's an observation

18

more

I don't know if you want to include

Those findings I can make now.

I make.
But I do

19

feel like more enlightenment might be needed.

20

is a p p a r e n t , I've

21

because you've got it by p r e s c r i p t i o n , and

22

got the public

23

avoided the promissory

that

As

estoppel
you've

thoroughfare.

MR. FELTON:

Your Honor, might it be

24

appropriate to have the findings prepared, and

then

25

when I file my objection we can deal with them?

I
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1 || m e a n , that might be the appropriate way.

Once

2 || they're prepared then we can deal with

your

3 II findings in light of my objections and

various

4

post-trial r e q u e s t s .

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

6

MR. FELTON:

7

MR. M. DAYLE JEFFS:

8

MR. FELTON:

9

MR. M. DAYLE JEFFS:

Is that

acceptable?
Y e s , it's acceptable.

I think that's —
It makes good sense.

10

That way if you want to cite case authority

11

anything else in support of your o b j e c t i o n s , the

12

promissory estoppel issue, you can do so.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. A. DEAN JEFFS:

or

Yes.
Your Honor, I do have

15

o n e , two q u e s t i o n s .

16

driveway extends up to the tree.

17

that was presented goes up past the tree to the

18

north side of the driveway, since the driveway

19

two sides that go around the t r e e , one on the

20

and —

21

THE COURT:

One is you said that
The

the

description

has
right

When I meant around the tree.

22

There's a Y up there and I would put it to the top

23

of the Y.

Is that what the description

24

MR. A. DEAN JEFFS:

25

MR. M. DAYLE JEFFS:

Yes

names?

(inaudible).

Yes.

That's c o r r e c t ,
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1

Your Honor.

2

THE COURT:

For purposes of the

3

I'll

4

portion.

5

only the right to use t h a t .

6

to get away from granting the public the right

7

use t h a t , although

8

and convincing

evidence that it was

established.

9

And definitely

the Kohlers have the

prescriptive

10
11

adopt that description.

That's the

findings
lower

And again, not giving any fee t i t l e , but
And I guess I'd

I think the evidence

right to use i t , as I've
MR. FELTON:

like

shows

to
clear

indicated.

Your H o n o r , I don't know if

12

this is the appropriate t i m e , but since there is a

13

finding that there is an easement

14

be appropriate

15

maintenance

16

co-tenants

17

costs should be

18

I think it would

for the Court to address

issue.

I do believe if we

on an e a s e m e n t , that future

the
have
maintenance

shared.

THE COURT:

They should.

And I would

make

19

that a finding that they ought to be shared

and

20

that it ought to be maintained

the

21

level that it's been maintained

22

if it's going to need resurfacing, etcetera, those

23

costs should be shared on that p o r t i o n .

24

25

MR. A. DEAN JEFFS:

fine, Your Honor.

a t , at least

over the y e a r s .

I think that would

But the decision as to what
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DECISIOSS
Appointment of administrator of estate.
This section prohibits the appointment of a
person to serve as administrator of a decedent's
estate if that person refuses to consent to such
appointment. In re Estate of duff, 587 P.2d
128 (Utah 1978).

ANALYSIS

In general.
Appointment of administrator of estate.
Withholding tax.
In general.
No man can have a vested interest in the
work or labor of another, nor has he a right to
insist that another work for him, since that
would violate this section. McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938).

Withholding tax.
Provision requiring that a city withhold
state income taxes due from employees does
not subject the city to involuntary servitude.
Salt Lake City v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah
2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. J u r . 2d Involuntary
Servitude and Peonage § 1 et seq.

C.J.S. — 70 C.J.S. Peonage § 3; 80 C.J.S.
Slaves § 10.
Key Numbers. — Slaves «=» 24.

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation, and does not
require compensation to be paid in advance.
Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379,
503 P.2d 144 (1972).

ANALYSIS

Advance payment of compensation.
Airplane overflights.
Closing street.
Consequential damages.
—Railroad.
—Road construction.
—School construction.
Defense to condemnation proceeding.
Elements of taking or damage.
Fair market value.
Section self-executing.
Highway easement.
Intangible factors.
Interest in condemnation proceedings.
Inverse condemnation.
Just compensation.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Removal of personal property.
Services of attorney in defending indigent.
Statute of limitations.
Taxes.
Water rights.
Cited.

Airplane overflights.
For discussion of taking issues in an action
by landowners alleging that their land has
been "taken" by overflights, see Katsos v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah
1986).

Advance payment of compensation.
This section provides merely that the prop-

Closing street.
Where city, without notice, petition, or hearing, closes a portion of a street and alley abutting on school board-owned property on both
sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus
creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned property, there has been a taking requiring just
compensation. Boskovich v. Midvale City
Corp., 121 Utah 445, 243 P.2d 435 (1952).
Closing of city street and alleged impairment of access to commercial properties was
not a "damaging" or "taking" within the meaning of this section; the alleged damages resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence
and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably
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Rule 19

a claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first
having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for money.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 18, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joinder of claims.
—Tort, contract and equity.
Auto accident.
Same transaction.
—Unrelated claims by assignee.
Joinder of remedies.
—Insurer and tort-feasor.
Cited.
Joinder of claims.
—Tort, contract and e q u i t y .
Auto accident.
Where insurer of a vehicle involved in an
auto accident filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to void insurance policy due to
misrepresentations by the vehicle's owner in
the policy application, and one of the defendants in the declaratory judgment action counterclaimed against the insurer and crossclaimed in tort against the other defendants, in
determining whether to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim and cross-claim or permit
their joinder, the trial court should have permitted the joinder unless the insurer could
show that it would be prejudiced because of
bias by the trier of fact if joinder was allowed;
trial court should not have dismissed defendant's counterclaim and cross-claim on basis
that joinder was of both tort and contract actions. Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith, 646 P.2d
737 (Utah 1982).
Same t r a n s a c t i o n .
All issues, whether in contract, tort, law or
equity, arising out of a transaction between
two parties, may be pleaded and proved in a
single action. Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168,
369 P.2d 933 (1962).

—Unrelated claims by assignee.
Where seven different claimants assigned
twelve different causes of action to plaintiff for
purpose of collecting on them from a single defendant, and each cause of action arose from
facts unrelated to any of the other causes of
action so assigned, the single collector-plaintiff
was not permitted to join all of the claims
against defendant in one action despite the
provisions of the rule, since the assignors could
not have joined together and asserted their
various claims in one action against defendant
(Rule 20(a)), and an assignee cannot possess
any greater rights than those possessed by his
assignor. Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404
P.2d 964 (1965).
Joinder of remedies.
—Insurer and tort-feasor.
Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insurance company as a party defendant in a personal injury action, based on insurance policy
providing that the insurance company "has
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim
has been prosecuted to a conclusion," did not
come within the joinder provision of either
Subdivision (b) or Rule 20. Young v. Barney,
20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967).
Because there is no reason to believe the new
rules were intended to change prior practice of
not permitting disclosure to a jury of insurance
coverage in a personal injury suit, joinder of
tort-feasor with plaintiffs uninsured motorist
insurer is improper. Christensen v. Peterson,
25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971).
Cited in Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287,
351 P.2d 959 (1960).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
et seq.

1 Am. J u r . 2d Actions § 81

C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 61 to 101.
Key Numbers. — Action «=» 39 to 60.

Rule 19. J o i n d e r of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) P e r s o n s to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject m a t t e r of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or,
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
A
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(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicia) to him or those already parties; second, the extent
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons
why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 23.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 19, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Discretion of court.
Indispensable parties.
—Failure to join.
Assertion for first time at trial.
Assertion for first time on appeal.
Dismissal not bar to action on merits.
—Partner in joint venture.
—Two-part inquiry.
Joinder not required.
Necessary parties.
—Corporate stock transfers.
—Definition.
—Denial of joinder.
—Failure to intervene.
Effect upon subsequent suit.
—Failure to join.
—Involuntary plaintiff.
Relationship or interest.
—Joinder not required.
—Purpose of rule.
Cited.
Discretion of court.
Ordinarily, a trial court's determination
properly entered under this rule will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Seftel
v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Landes v. Capital
City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).
Indispensable parties.
—Failure to join.
Trial court abused its discretion in dismissing an action with prejudice for failure to join
indispensable parties, and not allowing an
amendment or granting a continuance, where
defendant claimed no surprise but merely relied on the likelihood of increased costs and
complexity if the amendment were granted. Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. Micro-Dex Corp., 739 P.2d 1131 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).

Assertion for first time at trial.
Under Rule 12(h), defense of failure to join
an indispensable party asserted for first time
at trial was to be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in light of any evidence received;
thus where defendants in action to enforce restrictive covenant did not adduce evidence sufficient to establish and identify an interest on
part of the alleged "indispensable party," so as
to require joinder, it was proper to refuse to
dismiss action. Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v.
Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d
1256 (Utah 1975).
——Assertion for first time on appeal.
A party may raise the issue of failure to join
an indispensable party at any time in the proceedings, including for the first time on appeal.
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Landes v.
Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).
Dismissal not bar to action on merits.
Dismissal for failure to join an indispensable
party is only an abatement of that particular
action and does not bar an action on the merits.
Thus, while dismissal on such ground may be
proper, dismissal with prejudice would be an
abuse of discretion, since the rules of procedure
are intended to encourage the adjudication of
disputes on their merits. Bonneville Tower
Condominium Mgt. Comm. v. Thompson
Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986).
—-Partner in j o i n t v e n t u r e .
Where a partner in a joint venture sued potential investors in the venture for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of agreement, the partner was required to either name
the partnership as party in interest or join his
partner as an indispensable party in interest.
Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984).

0-J5

Rule 20

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Co. v. United States, 9 U t a h 2d 428, 347 P.2d
184 (1959); Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.,
614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); State ex rel. Utah
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State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Toledo, 699 P.2d
710 (Utah 1985); Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d
1024 (Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. J u r . 2d Parties § 92
et seq.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 17 to 29, 30 to
32, 41 to 50.
A.L.R. — What constitutes "proper case"
within meaning of provision of Rule 19(a) of

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that when
person who should join as plaintiff refuses to do
so, he may be made involuntary plaintiff "in a
proper case," 20 A.L.R. Fed. 193.
Key Numbers. — Parties «= 13 to 20 V2, 24
to 35.

Rule 20. Permissive joinder of parties.
(a) Permissive joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if
they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them
will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants
if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence,
or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need
not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded.
Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their
respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to
their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate trials. The court may make such orders as will prevent a
party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a
party against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against
him, and may order separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or
prejudice.
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is substantially identical to Rule 20, F.R.C.P.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Separate trial authorized, U.R.C.P. 42(b).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

CO. V. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277
(1957).
n
®urer— P e r s o n a l injury action.
- D e c l a r a t o r y action as to effect of policy.
Plaintiffs attempt to join defendant's insur—Personal injury action.
a n c e c o m p a n y a s a p a r t y defendant in a perCited.
sonal injury action, based on insurance policy
Insurer.
providing that the insurance company "has
agreed to pay a claim only after another claim
— D e c l a r a t o r y a c t i o n a s to effect of policy.
h a 8 D e e n p r 0 secuted to a conclusion," did not
One who claims to be damaged by the neglic o m e within the joinder provision of either
gent act of another is not a proper party to an
Rule 18(b) or this rule. Young v. Barney, 20
action by the insurer of the latter under a pubUtah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967).
lie liability policy, whereby a declaratory judgCited in Stank v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 96, 404
ment is sought declaring the legal effect of the
P.2d 964 (1965); Dairyland Ins. Corp. v. Smith,
terms of such policy. Utah Farm Bureau Ins.
646 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
,

Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. J u r . 2d Parties § 92
et seq.; 75 Am. J u r . 2d Trial § 12.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 33 to 55; 88
C.J.S. Trial §§ 7 to 10.

Key N u m b e r s . — Parties *= 13 to 16, 24 to
27; Trial «=• 3, 4.

25-5-3

FRAUD

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2462;
C.L. 1917, § 5812; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 335-2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constructive trust.
Trusts.
—Evidence.
Wills.
Constructive trust.
Equity imposes a constructive trust to prevent one from unjustly profiting through fraud
or the violation of a duty imposed under a
fiduciary or confidential relationship. Hawkins
v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953).
After defendant altered a certificate of sale of
land by inserting his own name as purchaser, so
that the land was not included in the decedent's
estate, there was a constructive trust for the
benefit of the decedent's heirs, and the estate
could be reopened. Perry v. McConkie, 1 Utah
2d 189, 264 P.2d 852 (1953).
Constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment is not within the statute of frauds.
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah
1977).
Trusts.
Trusts arising by implication or operation of
law are expressly excluded from the effects of
the statute; and a deed of conveyance, though
absolute in form, if given to secure a debt, is in
equity treated as a mortgage — a trust by
operation of law. Wasatch Mining Co. v.
Jennings, 5 Utah 243, 15 P. 65 (1887).
Where defendant verbally agreed with the
owner of real estate which was subject to a
mortgage to bid the property in at foreclosure
sale, and to convey title to plaintiff for a sum
certain after he obtained the sheriff's deed, and
plaintiff relied on such agreement and paid the
specified amount to defendant who asserted
ownership to the property and refused to convey, it was held that a trust ex maleficio arose,
and was enforceable though the contract was

not in writing. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah 48,
95 P. 527 (1908).
A deed given to secure a debt, though absolute in form, was in equity a mortgage, so that
a trust was created by operation of law and,
under the express language of this section, was
not prevented by § 25-5-1. Taylor v. Turner, 27
Utah 2d 39, 492 P.2d 1343 (1972).
—Evidence.
One seeking to have rights declared and
enforced, founded upon or growing out of trust
or a confidential relation, is required to show,
with at least reasonable certainty, the terms of
agreement and the character and extent of the
trust or confidential relation. Coray v.
Holbrook, 40 Utah 325, 121 P. 572 (1912).
Parol evidence is admissible to show a trust
relationship by operation of law. Barrett v.
Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 P2d 772 (1941).
In an action to impress a trust upon real
property, evidence supported a finding that
grantor's daughter took the property by warranty deed subject to "oral trust" whereby
daughter was to maintain the property as a
family home to be used by grantor and her
children and grandchildren for as long as any of
said persons needed a home, with complete
discretion in the daughter as to the time and as
to which of said persons should use property.
Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P 2 d 229
(1949).
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove a
constructive trust or resulting trust since they
arise by operation of law and are expressly
excluded from the statute of frauds by this
section. In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111
(Utah 1982).
Wills.
When a will is sought to be maintained also
as a contract, it must satisfy this and succeeding sections of the statute of frauds. Ward v.
Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P.2d 635 (1938).

25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the
sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
H i s t o r y : R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2463;
C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 335-3.
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27-12-89

(i) the permission shall contain the condition t h a t any installation will be removed from the right-of-way at the request of the
city or town; and
(ii) the city or town shall cause any installation to be removed
at t h e request of the department when the department finds the
removal necessary(A) to eliminate a hazard to traffic safety;
(B) for the construction and maintenance of the state
highway; or
(C) to meet the requirements of federal regulations.
(3) If it is necessary t h a t a utility, as defined in Section 27-12-11, be
relocated on federal-aid highways, reimbursement shall be made for the
relocation as provided for in Section 27-12-11.
(4) (a) The department shall construct curbs, gutters, and sidewalks on
the state highways when it is found necessary by the department for
the proper control of traffic, driveway entrances, or drainage.
(b) If a state highway is widened or altered and existing curbs,
gutters, and sidewalks are removed, the department shall replace the
curbs, gutters, and sidewalks.
(5) The department may furnish and install street lighting systems for
the state highways, but their operation and maintenance is the responsibility of the city or town.
(6) If new storm sewer facilities are necessary in the construction and
maintenance of the state highways, the cost of the storm sewer facilities
shall be borne by the state and the city or town in a proportion mutually
agreed upon between the department and the highway authorities of the
city or town.
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, the department may make rules governing the location
and construction of approach roads and driveways entering the state
highway, and the department may delegate the administration of the rules
to the highway authorities of the city or town.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 88; 1991, ch.
137, § 21; 1994, ch. 120, § 36.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1991 amend
ment, effective April 29, 1991, redivided Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) to i3),
redesignated former Subsections (2) to (5) as
present Subsections (3) to (7), substituted "department" for "state road commission" throughout the section, and made changes in punctuation and phraseology

The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "for highways" for "with respect to
streets" in the introductory language, subdivided Subsection (2), substituted "department"
for "commission" in Subsections (6) and (7),
added the code citation in Subsection (7); and
made stylistic changes

ARTICLE 6
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR HIGHWAY
PURPOSES
27-12-89. Public use constituting dedication.
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for
a period of ten years.
319
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-13

78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways.
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares,
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of,
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser,
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous
and adverse possession of such real estate, in which case an adverse title may
be acquired
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-13.
Cross-References. — Dedication of streets,
§ 57-5 4
NOTES

Disposal of unused rights of way *J 27 12 97
Highways
continue
until
abandoned
* 27 12 90
Vacation of highways § 27-12 102 et seq

TO

DECISIONS
County Drainage Dist No 1, 763 P 2d 428
(Utah Ct App 1988)

ANALYSIS

Establishment of a holding by city
—Insufficient
Establishment of a holding by drainage district
Estoppel
—Affirmative acts
— Denied
Establishment of a holding by city.
— Insufficient
The citv must have some semblance of title
possession or right to use, and making a sur
vey, destruction of a fence between the street
and adjoining property, and verbal assertion of
ownership by the city are not sufficient to es
tabhsh a holding Gibbons v Salt Lake City
Corp, 6 Utah 2d 219, 310 P 2d 513 (1957)
Establishment of a holding by drainage
district.
The evidence indicated that land held by the
Utah County Drainage District Number 1 was
for pubhc use and therefore could not be ac
quired by adverse possession Averett v Utah

Estoppel.
— Affirmative acts.
There is no bar of the statute of limitations
against a city, in respect to a pubhc street
within its boundaries the city may however
be estopped by its affirmative acts to claim
land as part of a street Wall v Salt Lake City,
50 Utah 593 168 P 766 (1917)
— Denied.
Where city quitclaimed alley to private
party in contravention of statute for small con
sideration, and there was no evidence that
property ever was assessed against grantee or
his successors in interest and time element
was short and there was no replatting or
change in whole neighborhood to benefit of all
adjacent landowners there was no ground for
estoppel in pais as against city s right to quiet
title as against parties holding under grantee
of quitclaim deed Tooele City v
Elkmgton,
100 Utah 485 116 P 2d 406 (1941)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 3 Am J u r 2d Adverse Possession ^ 268 269
C.J.S. — 2 C J S Adverse Possession § 14

Key Numbers
8(1), (2)

Adverse Possession «=»

237
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57-3-3

REAL ESTATE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am J u r 2d Records and
Recording Laws § 98
C.e).S. — 92 C d S Vendor and Purchaser
§ 324
A.L.R. — Recorded real property instrument

as charging third party with constructive notice
of provisions of extrinsic instrument referred to
therein, 89 A L R 3d 901
Key N u m b e r s . — Vendor and Purchaser *$=>
231(1)

57-3-3. Effect of failure to record.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and
for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, ^ 2001;
C.L. 1917, § 4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 783-3; L. 1988, ch. 155, § 15; 1989, ch. 88, ^ 9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
interest If the grantee fails to record, he assumes the risk of a subsequent grantee of the
same land acquiring superior rights to his by
recordation Horman v Clark, 744 P2d 1014
(Utah Ct App 1987)

ANALYSIS

Effect of failure to record
Mortgage
Obligation of grantor
Priorities
—Description of property insufficient
— Prior unrecorded conveyance
Cited

Priorities.

Effect of failure to record.
Where, after mortgage was executed on certain tract of land, owner executed deed to
grantee on property not included in mortgage,
which deed was not recorded, decree in action
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land, including
part conveyed to grantee was not binding on
grantee who was not party to such action
Federal Land Bank v Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48
P2d 480, 102 A L R 819 (1935)
Ajudgment hen is subordinate and inferior to
a deed which predated it whether recorded
after such judgment or whether not recorded at
all Kartchner v State Tax Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d
382, 294 P2d 790 (1956), Garland v
Fleischmann, 831 P 2 d 107 (Utah 1992)
Mortgage.
This section applies to mortgage hens, mortgagee is purchaser, and law of priority of record
applies to mortgages Federal Land Bank v
Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 P 2d 480, 102 A L R 819
(1935)
Obligation of grantor.
The grantor of property has no implied obligation to protect the grantee s rights by recording the grantees interest in the piopeity or by
informing third parties of the existence of the

— p e s c r i p t i o n of property insufficient.
Although defendant's deed was recorded
first, failure of deed to adequately descnbe
disputed portion of land resulted in omission of
that portion from the deed, so that plaintiff's
later-recorded deed, which included the disputed property, voided defendant's claim to the
property Neeley v Kelsch, 600 P2d 979 (Utah
1979)
—Prior unrecorded conveyance.
Innocent purchaser for value without notice
of previous conveyance, who first records his
convejance, takes preference over prior unrecorded conveyance McGarry v Thompson, 114
Utah 442, 201 P2d 288 (1948)
Later in time but prior recorded first mortgage took precedence over purchase money
mortgage where mortgagee had no notice of the
purchase money mortgage Kemp v Zions First
Nat'l Bank, 24 Utah 2d 288, 470 P2d 390
(1970)
Where buyers did not record their own conveyance, or contract, they did not obtain the
statutory protection enjoyed by subsequent
pu*chas«.rs vrv good fo\th s^d for vaius, agaAO&t
unrecorded interests Gregerson v Jensen, 669
P 2 d 396 (Utah 1983)
Cited in Billings v Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd (In
re Granada, Inc ), 92 Bankr 501 (Bankr D
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MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE

57-9-4

(3) The rights of any person arising from prescriptive use or a period of
adverse possession or user, which was in whole or in part subsequent to
the effective date of the root of title
(4) Any interest arising out of a title transaction which has been
recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title from which the
unbroken chain of title of record is started, provided, however, that such
recording shall not revive or give validity to any interest which has been
extinguished prior to the time of the recording by the operation of Section
57-9-3
(5) The exceptions stated in Section 57-9-6 as to rights of reversioners
in leases, as to apparent easements and interests in the nature of
easements, and as to interests of the United States
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 2.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Adverse possession
Boundary by acquiescence
Adverse possession.
Citys continuous possession and use of canal
for over ninety years and use of the land on
both sides thereof in the maintenance of the
canal established title in such land by adverse
possession possession was hostile in that it
was of such character that ownership could be
inferred therefrom, city acquired title despite

nonpayment of taxes due to the acquisition of
title prior to the enactment of the statute requiring payment of taxes as a condition of
obtaining the title to land State ex rel Rd
£ ™ v Cox CorP • 29 U t a h 2d 127 5 0 6 P 2 d
Boundary bv acquiescence.
This chapter did not apply to defeat funda
mental doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
established in the defendants in a quiet title
action Olsen v Park Daughters Inv Co , 29
Utah 2d 421 511 P2d 145 (1973)

57-9-3. Marketable record title held free and clear of
interests, claims and charges.
Subject to the provisions of Section 57-9-2, the marketable record title shall
be held by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the land
free and clear of all interests, claims or charges, whatsoever, the existence of
which depends upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior
to the effective date of the root of title All such interests, claims or charges,
however denominated, whether legal or equitable, present or future, whether
such interests, claims or charges are asserted by a person sui juris or under a
disability, whether such person is within or without the state, whether such
person is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby
declared to be void
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 3.

57-9-4. Filing of notice of claim of interest authorized —
Effect of possession of land by record owner of
possessory interest.
(1) Any person claiming an interest in land may preserve and keep effective
such interest by filing for record during the forty-year period immediately
following the effective date of the root of title of the person whose record title
357
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REAL ESTATE

would otherwise be marketable, a notice in writing, duly verified by oath,
setting forth the nature of the claim. No disability or lack of knowledge of any
kind on the part of anyone shall suspend the runmng of the forty-year period.
The notice may be filed for record by the claimant or by any other person acting
in behalf of any claimant who is
(a) under a disability,
(b) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or
(c) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established or is
uncertain at the time of filing the notice of claim for record.
(2) If the same record owner of any possessory interest in land has been in
possession of such land continuously for a period of forty years or more, during
which period no title transaction with respect to such interest appears of
record in his chain of title, and no notice has been filed by him or on his behalf
as provided in Subsection (1), and such possession continues to the time when
marketability is being determined, such period of possession shall be deemed
equivalent to the filing of the notice immediately preceding the termination of
the forty-year period descnbed in Subsection (1).
History: L. 1963, ch. 109, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Adverse possession.
Boundary by acquiescence
Adverse possession.
City's continuous possession and use of canal
for over ninety years and use of the land on
both sides thereof in the maintenance of the
canal established title in such land by adverse
possession, possession was hostile in that it
was of such a character that ownership could be
inferred therefrom; city acquired title despite

nonpayment of taxes due to the acquisition of
title prior to the enactment of the statute requiring payment of taxes as a condition of
obtaining the title to land. State ex rel. Rd.
Commn v Cox Corp , 29 Utah 2d 127, 506 P2d
54(1973).
B o u n d a r y by a c q u i e s c e n c e .
This chapter did not apply to defeat fundamental doctrine of boundary by acquiescence
established in the defendants in a quiet title
action Olsen v Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29
Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Slander of title, sufficiency of plaintiff's interest in real property to maintain action, 86 A.L R 4th 738

57-9-5. Notice of claim of interest — Contents — Filing for
record.
To be effective and to be entitled to record, the notice referred to above shall
contain an accurate and full description of all land affected by such notice
which description shall be set forth in particular terms and not by general
inclusions; but if the claim is founded upon a recorded instrument, then the
description in the notice may be the same as that contained in the recorded
instrument. The notice shall be filed for record in the registry of deeds of the
county or counties where the land described therein is situated. The recorder
of each county shall accept all such notices presented to him which describe
land located in the county in which he serves and shall enter and record full
copies thereof in the same way that deeds and other instruments are recorded
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Section
27-12-137.6.
27-12-137.7
27-12-137.8.
27-12-137.9.

27-12-137.10.

27-12-137.11.
27-12-137.12.
27-12-137.13.
27-12-138.
27-12-138.5.
27-12-139.
27-12-140.
27-12-141.

27-12-142.
27-12-143.

27-12-144.

Conditions for licensing of
junkyard within 1,000 feet of
highway.
Screening of existing junkyards.
Repealed.
Junkyards not adaptable to
screening — Authority of department to acquire land —
Compensation.
Junkyard operated in violation
of provisions is public nuisance — Abatement — Correction notice.
Enforcement
authority
—
Agreements
with
United
States.
Present ordinances or regulations saved.
Violations — Misdemeanor.
Obstructing traffic on sidewalks
or highways prohibited.
Gates on B system county highways.
Driving animals over highways
— Liability for damages.
Limited highways — Penalty
for driving animals over.
Escaping water and other obstructions — Injuring or obstructing highway — Penalty
for violations.
Injury to trees on highways —
Penalty for violations.
Violations of rules as to use —
Damage to signs, warnings,
or barriers — Penalty.
Liability for damage to highway,
highway equipment, or highway sign — Liability for damage to highway from illegal
operation or oversize or overweight vehicles — Recovery.

Section
27-12-145.

Highway authority — Restrictions on highway use — Erection and maintenance of signs
designating restrictions —
Penalty.
27-12-146.
Loads on vehicles — Confining,
securing, and fastening load
required — Penalty.
27-12-147.
Repealed.
27-12-148.
Application of size, weight, and
load limitations for vehicles
— Exceptions.
27-12-149.
Limitations as to vehicle width,
height, length, and load extensions.
27-12-150.
Towing requirements and limitations on towing.
27-12-151.
Maximum gross weight limitation for vehicles — Bridge formula for weight limitations —
Minimum mandatory fines.
27-12-152.
Repealed.
27-12-153.
Measuring vehicles for size and
weight compliance — Summary powers of peace officers
— Penalty for violations.
27-12-154.
Oversize permits and oversize
and overweight permits for
vehicles of excessive size or
weight — Applications — Restrictions — Fees — Rulemaking provisions — Penalty.
27-12-155 to 27-12-157. Repealed.
Article 13
E s t a b l i s h m e n t of Specific H i g h w a y s
27-12-158, 27-12-159. Repealed.
27-12-160.
1-15 designated as Veterans'
Memorial Highway.
27-12-161.
Legacy Loop Highway.

ARTICLE 1
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND DEFINITIONS
27-12-1.

Repealed.

R e p e a l s . — Section 27-12-1 (L. 1963, ch. 39,
§ 1), the legislative declaration of intent, was
repealed by Laws 1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, § 53.

27-12-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Commission" means the Transportation Commission appointed
under Section 63-49-10.
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(2) "Construction" means the construction, reconstruction, replacement, and improvement of the highways, including the acquisition of
rights-of-way and material sites.
(3) "Department" means the Department of Transportation created in
Section 63-49-4.
(4) "Executive director" means the executive director of the department
appointed under Section 63-49-5.
(5) "Farm tractor" has the meaning set forth in Section 41-la-102.
(6) "Highway" means any public road, street, alley, lane, court, place,
viaduct, tunnel, culvert, bridge, or structure laid out or erected for public
use, or dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made public in an action
for the partition of real property, including the entire area within the
right-of-way.
(7) "Highway authority" means the department or the legislative,
executive, or governing body of a county, city, or town.
(8) "Implement of husbandry" has the meaning set forth in Section
41-la-102.
(9) "Limited-access facility" means a highway especially designated for
through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants
of abutting lands nor other persons have any right or easement, or have
only a limited right or easement of access, light, air, or view.
(10) (a) "Port-of-entry" means a fixed or temporary facility constructed,
operated, and maintained by the department where drivers, vehicles,
and vehicle loads are checked or inspected for compliance with state
and federal laws as specified in Section 27-12-19
(b) "Port-of-entry" includes inspection and checking stations and
weigh stations.
(11) "Port-of-entry agent" means a person employed at a port-of-entry to
perform the duties specified in Section 27-12-19.
(12) "Right-of-way" means real property or an interest in real property,
usually in a strip, acquired for or devoted to a highway.
(13) "Semitrailer" has the meaning set forth in Section 41-1 a-102.
(14) "State highway" means those highways designated as state highways in Title 27, Chapter 12, Article 4, Designation of State Highways,
and under Section 27-12-27.
(15) "State highway purposes" has the meaning set forth in Section
27-12-96.
(16) "Trailer" has the meaning set forth in Section 41-la-102.
(17) "Truck tractor" has the meaning set forth in Section 41-la-102.
(18) "UDOT" means the Utah Department of Transportation.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 2; 1975 (1st
S.S.), ch. 9, § 4; 1990, c h . 88, § 1; 1991, ch.
137, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 3; 1994, c h . 7, § 1;
1994, ch. 11, § 1; 1994, c h . 120, § 29.
Amendment N o t e s . — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, rewrote Subsection (1), which read "'Commission,' 'state road
commission,' or 'highway department' means
the appropriate division, office, commission, or
committee in the Utah Department of Transportation", added Subsections (3), (4) and (13),
redesignated former Subsections (3) to (10) as
Subsections (5) to (12) and Subsections (11) to

(13) as Subsections 114) to (16); deleted "of
Transportation" after 'depaitment" and substituted "commission" for "Utah Transportation
Commission" and "or" for "and" before "governing body" in Subsection (7), substituted "Implement" for "Implements" at the beginning of
Subsection (8), and substituted "real propeity
or an interest in real property" for "land, property, or an interest therein" in Subsection (11)
The 1992 amendment, effective January 30,
1992, substituted the present code citation in
Subsections (5), (8), (12), U5), and (16) for
"Section 41 1 1" and made stylistic changes
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tiff who owned the fee simple interest in the
land on which the street was situated had not
paid any taxes on the street property for 25
years, this combination of factors was sufficient
to justify finding that the street had been
dedicated to public use. Bonner v. Sudbury, 18
Utah 2d 140, 417 P.2d 646 (1966).
Clear and convincing quantum and quality of
proof is required for the establishment of a
public thoroughfare or taking of another's property. Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493
P.2d 639 (1972).
Where the trial court found that public had
used north-south road for 12 years and that
during this time, the road was ten feet wide,
and the court found that there was insufficient
use of an east-west road by the public to make
it a public road, these findings of fact, supported by substantial evidence, compelled a
holding that the north-south road was a public
highway ten feet wide and that no public highway existed on the east-west road. Western
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
For cases finding sufficient evidence to support finding of dedication to public use, see
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 P. 954
(1930); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116
P.2d 420 (1941); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395,
326 P.2d 107 (1958); Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah
2d 212, 341 P.2d 424 (1959).

fare. Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438
P.2d 545 (1968).
Rights g r a n t e d to public.
City still owned fee to strip, acquired under
Tbwnsite Act (43 U.S.C. § 718 et seq., now
repealed), after alleged dedication thereof as
public street, so that only right that public
could have acquired would be n g h t to easement
across strip for traveling purposes, and only
additional right contiguous property owners
might acquire would be right of ingress to and
egress from their property. Premium Oil Co. v.
Cedar City, 112 Utah 324, 187 P.2d 199 (1947).
Rights of s u b s e q u e n t g r a n t e e s .
Where land is dedicated by owner as highway
and is accepted by public as such, all subsequent grantees of abutting lands are bound by
dedication. Schettler v. Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64
P. 955 (1901).
Sufficiency of proof of d e d i c a t i o n .
Highway over privately owned ground will be
deemed dedicated or abandoned to the public
use when the public has continuously used it as
a thoroughfare for a period often years. Morris
v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916).
Mere use by public of private alley in common
with owners of alley does not show a dedication
thereof to public use, or vest any right in public
to the way. Thompson v. Nelson, 2 Utah 2d 340,
273 P.2d 720 (1954).
Though dedication of one's land to public use
should not be lightly regarded, where a narrow,
private dead-end street was used by neighboring residents and the general public without
interference for at least 25 years, and where the
city had platted it as a public street in 1915 and
had thereafter paved it and maintained a public street sign at its entrance, and where plain-

27-12-90

"Thoroughfare" a n d "public thoroughfare" d i s t i n g u i s h e d .
Under identically worded predecessor section, a "thoroughfare" was a place or way
through which there is passing or travel. It
became a "public thoroughfare" when the public
acquired a general right of passage. Morris v.
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 (1916).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways,
Streets, and Bridges § 25 et seq.

C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Highways § 15.
Key N u m b e r s . — Highways <s=» 6(1).

27-12-90, Highways once established continue until abandoned.
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having jurisdiction
over any such highway, or by other competent authority.
H i s t o r y : L. 1963, c h . 39, § 90.
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27-12-22. County roads — Class B roads — Construction
and maintenance by counties — Levy.
(1) County roads comprise all public roads and streets within the state:
(a) not designated as state highways that are situated outside of
incorporated municipalities;
(b) that have been designated as county roads; and
(c) those public roads located within a national forest and constructed
or maintained by the county under agreement with the appropriate
federal agency.
(2) County roads are class B roads.
(3) County roads are under the jurisdiction and control of the county
governing bodies of the respective counties and shall be constructed and
maintained by or under the authority of the county governing bodies of the
respective counties from funds made available for that purpose.
(4) The county legislative body has authority to expend or by contract cause
to be expended the funds allocated to each county from the Transportation
Fund under rules made by the department.
(5) When the county legislative body considers the funds available for
county road purposes from sources other than the levy made against tangible
property adequate to properly construct and maintain the class B roads, the
county may:
(a) cease making a levy for county road purposes; or
(b) use any portion of the class B road funds provided by this chapter for
the construction and maintenance of class A state roads by cooperative
agreement with the department.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 22; 1967, ch. 50,
§ 1; 1991, ch. 137, § 13; 1993, ch. 227, § 296;
1994, ch. 120, ^ 31.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"county governing body" and "county governing
bodies" for "county commissioners" throughout
the section; substituted "department" for "state
road commission" at the end of the section, and
otherwise rewrote the section to such an extent
that a detailed analysis is impracticable
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993,
substituted "county legislative body" for

"county governing body" in Subsection (5)
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "municipalities" for "cities and
towns" in Subsection (l)(a), in Subsection (4),
substituted "legislative body" for "governing
bodies" and "department" for "commission",
subdivided Subsection (5), and made stylistic
changes
Cross-References. — Counties, power to
levy taxes, § 17-5-248
General powers of counties, Title 17, Chapter
4
Special road districts, § 17A-3-1201 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in J B Ranch, Inc v Grand County,
958 F2d 306 (10th Cir 1992)

27-12-23. City streets — Class C roads — Construction
and maintenance — Use of levy.
(1) City streets comprise*
(a) highways within the corporate limits of the municipalities that are
not designated as class A state roads or as class B roads; and
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(b) those highways located within a national forest and constructed or
maintained by the municipality under agreement with the appropriate
federal agency.
(2) City streets are under the jurisdiction and control of the governing
officials of the municipality.
(3) City streets are class C roads.
(4) The department shall cooperate with the municipal legislative body in
the construction and maintenance of the class C roads within each municipality, and the municipal legislative body shall expend or cause to be expended
upon the class C roads the amount allocated to each municipality from the
Transportation Fund under rules made by the department.
(5) Any town or city in the third class may:
(a) contract with the county or the department for the construction and
maintenance of class C roads within its corporate limits; or
(b) transfer, with the consent of the county, its:
(i) class C roads to the class B road system; and
(ii) funds allocated from the Transportation Fund to the municipality to the county legislative body for use upon the class C roads.
(6) When the municipal legislative body of any municipality of the third
class considers the funds available for road purposes from sources other t h a n
the levy made against tangible property adequate to properly construct and
maintain the class C roads within any municipality, the municipal legislative
body may use any portion of the class C road funds allocated to the municipality for the construction of sidewalks, curbs, and gutters on class A state
roads within the municipal limits by cooperative agreement with the department.
History: L. 1963, ch. 39, § 23; 1969, ch. 67,
§ 1; 1991, c h . 137, § 14; 1993, ch. 227, § 297;
1994, c h . 120, § 32.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, subdivided the
section; substituted "department" for "state
road commission" and "county governing body"
for "county commissioners" where the references appear; substituted "City streets" for "All
public roads or streets" at the beginning of
Subsection (1); substituted "highways" for "public roads" in Subsection (1Kb); substituted
"Transportation Fund" for "state road fund" in
Subsections (4) and (5)(b); substituted "made by
the commission" for "and regulations mutually
adopted by the city officials and the state road
commission" in Subsection (4) and for "mutually adopted by the county commissioners and

the state road commission" in Subsection (5)(b);
and made changes in phraseology.
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993,
deleted "governing body" after "county" in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and substituted "county
legislative body" for "county governing body" in
Subsection (5)(b).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "municipality" and "municipalities"
for the various singular and plural forms of
"city and town" throughout; substituted "municipal legislative body" for "governing officials
of cities and towns" and "governing officials"
throughout; substituted "department" for "commission" at the end of Subsection (4); and made
stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Powers of cities, Title
10, Chapter 8.

27-12-23.5. Jurisdiction over highways leading to and
within state parks.
(1) The department, a county, or a city has jurisdiction over and responsibility for:
(a) primary access highways to state parks;
(b) highways to the main attraction within each state park; and
(c) highways through state parks providing access to land uses beyond
state park boundaries.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634
F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Farmers New

World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d
141 (Utah 1990).

63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery
of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon or to determine any
adverse claim thereon, or secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or
other lien said entity may have or claim on the property involved.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 6.
Cross-References. — Mortgage foreclosure
actions, § 78-37-1 et seq.

Quiet title actions, * 78-40-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

only as clearly expressed therein Holt v Utah
State Rd Comm , 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P 2d 1286
(1973).

Construction and application.
Scope of section.
Construction and application.
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the
recovery of any property real or personal or for
the possession t h e r e o f does not include an action for damages for impairment of access to
property caused by construction of highway
underpass; this act should be strictly construed
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it

63-30-7.

S c o p e of section.
This section waives immunity only for actions to recover property, quiet title, clear title,
or resolve disputes over mortgages or liens
held by a governmental entity; a claim alleging damage or destruction of private property
by a governmental entity does not fall within
the grant of immunity in this section Hansen
v. Salt Lake County, 794 P 2d 838 (Utah 1990)

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1991, ch. 76, <* 10 repeals
§ 63-30-7, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch.
204, *) 1, waiving immunity for injury from

negligent operation of motor vehicles, with exceptions, effective April 29, 1991.

63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways,
bridges, or other structures.
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of
any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct, or other structure located on them.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8; 1991, ch. 76,
§ 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added "Unless

the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section
63-30-10," and made several stylistic changes
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CHAPTER 34
EMINENT DOMAIN
Section
78-34-1.
78-34-2.
78-34-3.
78-34-4.
78-34-5.
78-34-6.
78-34-7.
78-34-8
78-34-9.

78-34-10.
78-34-11.
78-34-12.

Uses for which right may be exercised.
Estates and rights that may be
taken.
Private property which may be
taken.
Conditions precedent to taking.
Right of entry for survey and location.
Complaint — Contents.
Who may appear and defend.
Powers of court or judge.
Occupancy of premises pending
action — Deposit paid into
court — Procedure for payment
of compensation.
Compensation and damages —
How assessed.
When right to damages deemed to
have accrued.
When title sought found defective
— Another action allowed

Section
78-34-13.
78-34-14
78-34-15.
78-34-16.

78-34-17
78-34-18.
78-34-19.

78-34-20

Payment of award — Bond from
railroad to secure fencing.
Distribution of award — Execution — Annulment of proceedings on failure to pay.
Judgment of condemnation — Recordation — Effect.
Substitution of bond for deposit
paid into court — Abandonment of action by condemner —
Conditions of dismissal
Rights of cities and towns not affected.
When right of way acquired —
Duty of party acquiring.
Action to set aside condemnation
for failure to commence or complete construction within reasonable time.
Sale of property acquired by eminent domain.

78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised.
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may
be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:
(1) All public uses authorized by the Government of the United States.
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other
public uses authorized by the Legislature.
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city or
incorporated town, or board of education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts,
flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of any
county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams,
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for
the benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the inhabitants
thereof.
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads,
byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction
engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and
railroads and street railways for public transportation.
(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, smelters or
other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other
uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming of
lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or
for solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution.
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(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes and
dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting or other reduction of
ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits
including minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other
works for the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or
mineral deposits including minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal
pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground storage of natural gas, and in connection therewith such other interests in property as may be required
adequately to examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such underground
natural gas storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; also any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines,
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores,
or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter.
(7) Byroads leading from highways to residences and farms.
(8) Telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and
sites for electric light and power plants.
(9) Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than
ten families, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any
college or university.
(10) Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat.
(11) Cemeteries and public parks.
(12) Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the manufacture of beet sugar.
(13) Sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores
and necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to
take lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes and
dust therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, that
the powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any
county where the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile
of the limits of any city or incorporated town; nor unless the proposed
condemner has the right to operate by purchase, option to purchase or
easement, at least seventy-five per cent in value of land acreage owned by
persons or corporations situated within a radius of four miles from the
mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the
limits of said four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of
land within said limit and providing for the operation of such mill,
smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an action shall
have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter or
other works for the reduction of ores.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-34-1; L. 1957, ch. 174, § 1; 1963,
ch. 193, § 1; 1969, ch. 258, § 1; 1973, ch. 206,
§ 1; 1981, ch. 164, § 1.
Cross-References. — Airports, §§ 2-2-5,
2-2-9, 2-2-10, 2-4-13.

Corporations, property and franchises subject to condemnation, Utah Const., Art. XII,
Sec. 11.
County improvement districts, § 17A-2-312.
County service areas, § 17A-2-412.
Ditches, reservoirs, etc., § 73-1-6.
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was "incarcerated" since she had not sought
release and had she done so, superintendent
could obtain court order preventing her release Emery v State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P 2d
1296 (1971)
State's immunity from suit was waived under this section in action alleging negligent
treatment of suicidal patient by psychiatrist
and psychologist at university medical center
Frank v State, 613 P 2d 517 (Utah 1980)

the lender that a duplicate vehicle title had
been issued and that it had improperly issued
to the borrower the title certificate upon which
the lender relied in making its loan, was
barred by governmental immunity The issuance of motor vehicle titles and recordkeeping
responsibilities are governmental functions
and have immunity under *> 63-30-3 Further,
the statutory waiver of immunity for negligence does not apply, under Subsection (3) of
this section, when the alleged injury arises out
of the issuance of a title certificate Metropolitan Fin Co v State, 714 P 2d 293 (Utah 1986)

Trees negligently cut.
City and sidewalk contractor were liable for
damage sustained by abutting homeowner
when trees were blown down as result of unnecessary and negligent cutting of roots Morn s v Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P 373
(1909)

Cited in Ingram v Salt Lake City, 733 P 2d
126 (Utah 1987), Maddocks v Salt Lake City
Corp , 740 P 2d 1337 (Utah 1987), Loveland v
Orem City Corp, 746 P 2d 763 (Utah 1987),
Birkner v Salt Lake County, 771 P 2d 1053
(Utah 1989), Prows v State, 822 P 2d 764
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Vehicle title certificate.
A lender's complaint against the State Tax
Commission, claiming that the commission
and its employees negligently failed to advise
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Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
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Liability of hospital or sanitarium for negligence of physician or surgeon, 51 A L R 4th
235
Municipal liability for negligent fire inspection and subsequent enforcement, 69 A L R 4th
739
Admissibility of evidence of polygraph test
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63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking private property without compensation.
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity
from suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or
damaged private property for public uses without just compensation
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain.
History: C. 1953, 63-30-10.5, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 75, * 3; 1991, ch. 76, * 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-

ment, effective April 29, 1991, added "As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution," and inserted for public uses" in
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25-4-1

FRAUD

CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102.)

25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed.
Repeals. — Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L.
1931, ch. 54, §§ 1 to 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-4-1 to 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of

wool, were repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154,
§ 10-102.

CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in
lands.
Certain agreements void unless written and signed.
Representation as to credit of third
person.

Section
25-5-6.
25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

Promise to answer for obligation of
another — When not required to
be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974,
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 33-5-1.
Cross-References. — Contract for sale of
goods for $500 or more unenforceable in absence of some writing, § 70A-2-201.

Enforceability of security interests, § 70A-9203.
Securities sales, statute of frauds for contracts, § 70A-8-319.
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal property not otherwise covered, § 70A-1-206.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adjoining landowners.
Agent's authority.
Blank deeds or papers.
Construction and application.
Contents of deed.
Corporate officers.
Custom and usage.
Dedication of land.
Defenses to action on contract.

Easements.

Gias.
Interest in real property.
Leases.
Modifications of contract.
Mortgages.
Nature of required writing.
Option to purchase.
Oral contracts to buy or sell land.
—Recovery of money paid.
Parol executed agreement.
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